June 3,
1961—Any hopes that John F. Kennedy harbored for easing superpower
tensions were quickly discarded when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
badgered and bullied the inexperienced American President in their first and
only face-to-face meeting.
The
importance of the Vienna Summit did not lie in any agreements concluded,
but instead in the attempt made by the cool, aristocratic, 43-year-old JFK and
the volatile, 67-year-old former peasant to take the measure of the other. The
differences between the democracy and the Communist dictatorship they headed
were heightened by their temperaments.
When the
talks, conducted in the US and Soviet embassies in this nonaligned Central
European city, ended the following day, Kennedy noted carefully to the pack of
reporters that no issues had been settled. Privately, to those he trusted more,
he was blunter.
“He just
beat the hell out of me,” JFK told influential New York Times columnist
James Reston. “It was the worst thing in my life. He savaged me.”
Kennedy
was unprepared for this diplomatic drubbing. Suffering from intense back pain
and Addison’s Disease (an adrenal insufficiency that causes persistent fatigue
and muscle weakness), he had brought with him to the summit a physician to
celebrities, Dr. Max Jacobson.
Injections
administered by “Dr. Feelgood” temporarily relieved the President’s symptoms
(even giving him such a sense of euphoria that he bounded down steps to greet Khrushchev
on the first day).
But the
mixture of “vitamins” may have contained amphetamines, which, diplomatic
historian Michael Beschloss observed in his superb The Crisis Years, can cause “nervousness, garrulousness, impaired judgment,
overconfidence, and, when the drug wears off, depression.”
Did Khrushchev, who
had risen into Joseph Stalin’s inner circle by staying alert to threats and
weaknesses of rivals, notice any of these signs of the drug in the man facing
him?
While Kennedy
carried with him to Vienna physical problems that could have hampered his
performance, Khrushchev brought psychological ones that complicated the talks.
Psychiatrists
have formulated “the Goldwater rule” to warn against assessing the mental health
of a candidate without examination by a professional.
But, given
totalitarian regimes’ barriers to unfettered access to information, the US
Central Intelligence Agency may have come as close as anyone ever will in a 1961
“personality sketch” which concluded that Khrushchev suffered from “hypomania,”
associated with “lability of mood and with rapid shifts to anger or
depression.”
That
condition would explain many, if not all, of Khrushchev’s shifts from earthy
humor to violent outbursts like his notorious shoe-banging episode at the
United Nations, as well as impulsive tactical moves that caught both Western
adversaries and ostensible Kremlin colleagues off guard.
The failed
American-backed invasion of Cuba only six weeks before the summit furnished Khrushchev
with a cudgel against Kennedy—a pointed reminder that the U.S. had not only
interfered with another country in the Western Hemisphere but that it had been
inept and impotent in doing so.
But Khrushchev
also sought to convert a Soviet disadvantage—a swelling exodus of refugees from
Communist-controlled East Berlin to the Western-oriented sector of the city—into
yet another weapon against JFK. The US must either agree to a settlement favorable
to East Berlin in six months, he insisted, or the USSR would forge its own
agreement with it that would leave it free to cut off Western access to the
city.
"Force
will be met by force. If the US wants war, that's its problem. It is up to the
US to decide whether there will be war or peace,” Khrushchev told JFK.
“Then, Mr.
Chairman, there will be war,” Kennedy answered. “It will be a cold
winter."
Khrushchev’s
ultimatum and loose talk about nuclear weapons stunned the American. I wrote
earlier that no agreement was reached in Vienna, but it would be a mistake to
say there were no consequences. JFK went home and, after consulting with
advisers, delivered a televised address to the American people in which he called
for:
*an
additional $3.25 billion in defense spending,
*doubling
and tripling of draft calls,
*calling
up reserves,
*raising
the Army's total authorized strength,
*increasing
active duty numbers in the Navy and Air Force,
*reconditioning
planes and ships in mothballs, and
*minimizing
the number of Americans that would be killed in a nuclear attack through a new
civil defense program.
Under intense
internal pressure from the Politburo, Khrushchev erected the Berlin Wall and
resumed above-ground nuclear testing after the summit. The most dangerous period
of the Cold War, climaxing over a year later in the Cuban Missile Crisis,
ensued.