July 6, 1775—Nearly one year before the Second Continental Congress issued the Declaration of Independence, it took the first step at airing the grievances of the 13 colonies over British depredations.
Two
delegates who locked horns in the debate leading to independence, Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson, took turns in creating Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, which sought to assure
the public—and, in far-off Great Britain, King George III—that their problems
were not with the monarch but with his ministers imposing coercive measures on
the colonies.
Years
later, John Adams recalled that during the American Revolution,
one-third of the colonists supported the cause, one-third were opposed, and
one-third were neutral. If anything, non-supporters of independence were still
in the ascendant one year earlier, but events were assuming a momentum that
many feared could not be controlled.
This
latter group is not as celebrated as the radicals, who won the vote for
independence in the Second Continental Congress and, in the end, the war
itself. They come off especially badly in the musical 1776.
But the
moderates’ stance was not without merit, and they marshaled compelling
arguments for the colonists’ rights before the Declaration of Independence and
contributed to the republic afterward.
The most
prominent moderate delegates from two large middle colonies, including New
York’s John Jay, who became the first Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court;
Pennsylvania’s James Wilson, among the keenest legal minds of the revolutionary
and Federalist periods; and Robert Morris, a wealthy Philadelphia merchant who
earned the nickname “Financier of the Revolution” through his crucial infusion
of money when the Continental Army was at its most desperate.
But the
leader of the group in the debates already convulsing the Second Continental
Congress was Dickinson, a wealthy lawyer who, by refusing to sign the Declaration
of Independence—even though he promptly joined the Continental Army as a
private—immediately forfeited much of the credit he deserved for mobilizing American
opinion against British policies in his pamphlet Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (1768).
In devastating
critiques of the Stamp and Townshend Acts, Dickinson crafted one of the first
known strategies for nonviolent protest in American history, preferring to call
on economic pressure and appeals to the Mother Country’s longstanding care of
its faraway offspring (“where is maternal affection”?: he wondered) to bring
Britain’s ministers around.
Unlike fellow
Pennsylvania delegate Joseph Galloway, who wanted the colonists to be brought
more tightly under the British umbrella, Dickinson preferred that the colonists
be allowed to administer something more akin to home rule.
Yet his
reluctance to accept the inevitability of independence might have resulted from
internal divisions within his own extended clan. His in-laws included not just independence
firebrands but also loyalists and others whose allegiance could be swayed to
and fro—an example in microcosm of the split that Adams saw in the nation at
large.
On a committee
that the Continental Congress designated to respond to Britain, Dickinson found
himself working with a Virginia delegate less inclined to speak up but every
bit his equal as a penman: Thomas Jefferson, whose Summary View of the Rights of British America attracted wide notice within his colony and
among the other politicians gathered that year in Philadelphia.
The case
that the panel would present had assumed greater importance with the outbreak
of hostilities at the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Dickinson
read the first draft by Jefferson—and blanched over its fierce statements.
Jefferson
read Dickinson’s revisions, nodded—and mostly accepted only his minor
suggestions.
Dickinson reviewed Jefferson’s “fair copy,” made a few other suggestions—and, after some more changes, Congress had in its hands a document that slammed the “Legislature of Great-Britain” for being “stimulated by an inordinate Passion for a Power.” (To track the intense revision process behind Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, see this "Editorial Note" on the "Founders Online" Website.)
At the
same time, it pledged to readers that, while committed to defending their lands
and freedoms, “we mean not to dissolve that Union which has so long and so
happily subsisted between us, and which we sincerely wish to see restored.”
What a
difference a year would make. King George III’s high-handed refusal even to
consider the “Olive Branch Petition” adopted that same weekend in Philadelphia undermined
the warnings of Dickinson, its primary proponent, that the colonies were
incurring enormous risks by fighting Britain without a powerful ally or an effective
central government.
In the
end, the defiance of the Continental Congress brought on the violence and the assault
on privilege that concerned Dickinson. But the cause won out and even a
conservative reformer like Dickinson accommodated the new order by serving in the governments of Pennsylvania and Delaware. At his death in 1808, Jefferson hailed his onetime "moderate" opponent in the Continental Congress:
"Among the first advocates for the rights of his country when assailed by Great Britain, he continued to the last the orthodox advocate of the true principles of our new government, and his name will be consecrated in history as one of the great worthies of the revolution.”

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