On the 10th ballot at the Republican National
Convention in Chicago, with front-runners having pummeled each other silly and
unbearable heat bearing down on the delegates, lovable lightweight Warren G. Harding emerged as the nominee 100 years ago this week.
The
victory climaxed a careful multi-month campaign that had achieved greater momentum
four weeks earlier, when the U.S. Senator from Ohio called for a return to
“normalcy” that would end progressive legislation domestically and intervention
abroad.
For years, that reversion from government activism,
along with a scandal-plagued administration, led largely
liberal historians to place Harding among the lowest rung of Presidents.
In the last two decades, vigorously contrarian (and often conservative) scholars, tapping papers long (and wrongly) believed destroyed by the President's widow, challenged that assessment. That may have raised Harding’s standing somewhat, but he is still unlikely to rank among good or even fair Presidents.
In the last two decades, vigorously contrarian (and often conservative) scholars, tapping papers long (and wrongly) believed destroyed by the President's widow, challenged that assessment. That may have raised Harding’s standing somewhat, but he is still unlikely to rank among good or even fair Presidents.
But Harding’s quest for the nomination is one area
where the revisionists offer a more nuanced approach to our understanding of
the forces that propelled him to the Presidency. In particular, a 2004 biography by John Dean of Watergate fame persuasively argued that,
rather than being simply a favorite-son or dark-horse candidate who caught
lightning in a bottle, Harding had shrewdly positioned himself as an acceptable
second or third alternative to better-known candidates who could not secure the
nomination.
For at least the last four decades, national conventions have been scripted down to the minute. It was a far cry from what held sway through much of the 19th and 20th centuries. (In 1924, the Democrats went to 103 ballots before staggering out of New York with a compromise candidate, John W. Davis--who still lost that fall overwhelmingly.)
In 1920, bitter internecine warfare engulfed the three GOP front-runners: Gen. Leonard Wood, Gov. Frank Lowden and Sen. Hiram Johnson. On the eve of the convention, a campaign finance scandal damaged Wood and Lowden. However, Johnson was unable to pick up their delegates, as he was blamed for pushing the Senate probe about his two opponents.
In 1920, bitter internecine warfare engulfed the three GOP front-runners: Gen. Leonard Wood, Gov. Frank Lowden and Sen. Hiram Johnson. On the eve of the convention, a campaign finance scandal damaged Wood and Lowden. However, Johnson was unable to pick up their delegates, as he was blamed for pushing the Senate probe about his two opponents.
That paved the way for the success of the strategy
created by Harding’s campaign manager and friend, Harry Daugherty—i.e., secure commitments from delegates in the
rival camps to back Harding if their own candidate couldn’t break a convention
deadlock.
Harding enjoyed several other advantages when he
came to Chicago with his family, including a moderately conservative record
that appealed to important businessmen who backed the party; an amiable personality that seldom if ever alienated anyone; a wife who played
an unprecedented role behind the scenes and before the media; a wide-open field
following the death of Theodore Roosevelt a year and a half before; and a
handsome appearance that led more than one of his supporters to think that he “looked like a President.”
Daugherty secured the nomination for his Ohio buddy
following sleepless, frantic deliberations the night before in a 13th-floor
suite of the Blackstone Hotel—giving rise to the term “smoke-filled room” to
suggest party bosses secretly selecting nominees without taking into account
the wishes of primary voters.
Dean disputes the efficacy of that meeting, noting
that nothing had been decided in these freewheeling discussions that night and that the
real coup was pulled off the next morning on the convention floor by Daugherty’s
forces. But clearly, some crucial minds were changed by what went on in that
suite.
The second person to whom Harding owed his victory
was his wife, Florence Kling Harding,
who had been instrumental in his success as a newspaper editor and politician.
In
the lead-up to the convention, the formidable “Duchess” had convinced her
husband to stay the course after he had suffered two disastrous primary
defeats. At the convention itself, as detailed by biographer Carl S. Anthony, she “openly engaged the male
political reporters covering the deadlocked convention with remarks that, for
all intents and purposes, served as the blueprint for candidates’ spouse
convention speeches many generations in the future.”
But, as the ultimate prize appeared within her husband’s
grasp, Mrs. Harding was not as happy as might be expected. “I can see but one
word written over the head of my husband, if he is elected, and that word is
‘tragedy,’” she told reporters.
What caused her concern? She was certainly familiar
with her husband’s limited intelligence and his vulnerability to charlatans who took advantage of his too-trusting nature (both of which paved the way for the Teapot Dome scandal that undermined his reputation after his death).
But some of the unease stemmed from her conversation with a Washington fortune-teller who
predicted that her husband would make it to the Oval Office—then die there by “sudden,
violent, peculiar death by poison”—which, in one sense, did happen three years
later, when one of Warren’s doctors accidentally hastened his death by
prescribing purgatives that aggravated his cardiac condition.
But that remained far in the distance in the fall of 1920, when Harding benefited
from an electorate exhausted from World War I and Woodrow Wilson’s battle with
the GOP-controlled Senate over the League of Nations, as well as a recession
that began under the Democrat.
Still, a major obstacle loomed. In order to clear
the path to Harding’s victory in November, the Republican National Committee
paid his longtime mistress, Carrie Phillips, to go on a long trip to Asia so she would be unavailable to reporters who might discover her
relationship with the nominee, as well as her oft-voiced sympathy for Germany
during the war. She continued to be paid a yearly stipend by the GOP to assure her silence until her death in 1960.
(Due to litigation by Phillips' daughter and two of Harding's nephews, the President's erotic, pseudo-poetic correspondence with his paramour was not released by the Library of Congress until 2014.)
(Due to litigation by Phillips' daughter and two of Harding's nephews, the President's erotic, pseudo-poetic correspondence with his paramour was not released by the Library of Congress until 2014.)
GOP leaders were unaware of yet another of Harding’s
dangerous liaisons, this time with Nan Britton, two decades younger than
Phillips and three decades younger than the nominee. By the time of the
convention, she was eight months pregnant with his child—and, unlike Phillips,
would continue her relationship with Harding when he reached the White House. Her revelation of their relationship in a 1931 tell-all--long denied by Harding loyalists--was finally confirmed by DNA testing in 2015.
Dean, Amity Schlaes and Ronald Radosh and Allis
Radosh have argued in recent years that Harding is underrated as a President,
pointing to moderate views on race and his successfully attempt to revive the
economy.
But their reassessment, while an important correction to the record, only carries so much weight, as Harding's racial views were squarely in mainstream Republican thought at the time and never really challenged his base; important sections of the economy—notably, agriculture—did not benefit from the boom of the Twenties; and the President remained, intellectually, a featherweight.
But their reassessment, while an important correction to the record, only carries so much weight, as Harding's racial views were squarely in mainstream Republican thought at the time and never really challenged his base; important sections of the economy—notably, agriculture—did not benefit from the boom of the Twenties; and the President remained, intellectually, a featherweight.
Moreover, for all his work in journalism, Harding
continually offered up some of the most gaseous political rhetoric ever
produced in the White House. With memorable invective, newspaper columnist and editor H.L. Mencken summed up
Harding’s style as "Gamalielese" (a play on the President's middle name):
“He writes the worst English that I have ever
encountered. It reminds me of a string of wet sponges; it reminds me of
tattered washing on the line; it reminds me of stale bean soup, of college
yells, of dogs barking idiotically through endless nights. It is so bad that a
sort of grandeur creeps into it. It drags itself out of the dark abysm of pish,
and crawls insanely up the topmost pinnacle of posh. It is rumble and bumble.
It is flap and doodle. It is balder and dash.”
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