One day before committing himself to “binding up the
nation’s wounds” in his second Inaugural Address, Abraham Lincoln signed into law a bill creating the Bureau of
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Land. The new agency, called the Freedmen’s Bureau for short, was tasked
not merely with helping 4 million former slaves transition to freedom, but also
with stanching one of the greatest humanitarian crises to afflict America in
its first century of existence: hundreds of thousands of refugees displaced during
the four years of the Civil War.
Facing all of this, the Freedmen’s Bureau struggled
with inadequate staffing and money, a limited time commitment, and the active
hostility of white southerners and Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson.
Not surprisingly, it failed. But it originated in
the noblest of impulses—an attempt to coordinate the efforts of more than 50 Freedmen's Aid Societies, a loose private coalition that sent clothes, money,
schoolbooks, and teachers to prepare liberated slaves for freedom. And, though
its utopian vision of racial equality was undermined in a wave of reactionary
Jim Crow legislation that took place following the removal of Federal troops
from the defeated South, it educated a cadre of African-Americans who would
carry the reform banner into the 20th century.
One of the things that I regret most about my seven
years of writing this blog is that I have devoted not nearly enough space to
the subject of Reconstruction. This
post is an initial attempt to redress that balance and discuss one of the most important and controversial--but little-understood--eras on American History..
In the end, two things convinced me that the time
was right to deal with the era that Columbia University historian Eric Foner
has called “America's Unfinished Revolution”: 1) my visit this past November to
Beaufort, S.C., site of a number of individuals and events (including the
Freedmen’s Bureau) crucial in this period; and 2) a C-Span special telecast last month, on the burning of Columbia, S.C.—a fire that threw into high
relief the tensions arising among former Confederates, their now-emancipated
slaves, and Federal forces deeply ambivalent about dealing with both.
The Freedmen’s Bureau had been proposed two years
before the bill reached Lincoln’s desk on March 3, 1865, but it had languished
for two years while Capitol Hill lawmakers tried to figure out if it should
fall under the Treasury Department or the War Department. In the end, it fell
to the latter—perhaps in no small part because Federal army commanders had
already been dealing with, ad hoc and piecemeal, the heightened hopes but
extraordinary challenges facing former slaves—“contraband” seized from their
Confederate plantation owners—who had attached themselves to Union camps.
Plantation owners, even those who regarded
themselves as lenient, were stunned to find that their former chattel had no
wish to work for them again. A typical scene was recorded by Laura M. Towne, a Northern schoolteacher who had come
south to teach freedmen on the South Islands off the coast of South Carolina:
“One of the best and most powerful of the old rebels
returned awhile ago, and has been living in his old home on sufferance. His
people all went to tell him ‘huddy,’ and he was convinced of their toleration.
So he told them he should get back his land and wanted to know how many would
be willing to work for him for wages. They said none. ‘Why,’ he said, ‘hadn't
you as lief work for me as for these Yankees?’ ‘No, sir,’ they answered through
their foreman; ‘even if you pay as well, sir, we had rather work for the Yankees
who have been our friends.’”
The bureau was created in the expectation that it
would cease to exist in a year. In much the same way that British civil
servants a generation before had feared that offering relief to peasants
starving in the Irish Potato Famine would only increase their dependence on
government, even many most sympathetic to the freedmen worried about their
long-term reliance on government.
But one major difference existed between Ireland and
the former Confederate states: British bureaucrats stuck stubbornly to their
beliefs, turning a potato blight into a full-scale famine, while in America
lawmakers quickly saw that the law creating the Freedmen’s Bureau needed to be
extended and strengthened.
As they sought to re-impose the control they had
exerted over African-Americans before the war, the former Confederates found an
unexpected ally in Johnson. During the war, as military governor of Tennessee,
he had seemed as vengeful as any Northerner toward secessionists for fomenting
the war.
But after assuming the Presidency, he began to make common cause with his wartime enemies—including by vetoing the bill extending the Freedmen’s Bureau, which he saw as “unconstitutional," "unnecessary," and "extrajudicial."
Congress, now under Republican control, passed
a modified version of the bill over Johnson’s veto. The contention over the
bill opened a breach between President and Congress that would result in the
President’s impeachment by the House and near-removal from office.
The bureau was fortunate in the man that Andrew
Johnson appointed as a commissioner to the agency two months after its
establishment: General O.O. Howard. A
brave soldier who had fought at Gettysburg and with Sherman’s army,
conscientious if unimaginative, he personified a quality that the poet Alfred
Lord Tennyson described as “decent not to fail.’
W.E.B. DuBois took the measure of this capable if
limited administrator in his groundbreaking history, Black Reconstruction, 1860-1880: “An
honest and sincere man, with rather too much faith in human nature, little
aptitude for systematic business and intricate detail, he was nevertheless
conservative, hard-working, and, above all, acquainted at first-hand with much
of the work before him.”
As the war ended and white Southerners confronted
dire hunger, they were forced to petition the federal government they had once
defied for help. Their suppressed sense of humiliation turned into outright
resentment when they learned that blacks as well as whites would benefit from
this food aid program.
Their defiance was epitomized by Theodore Stark, the
mayor of Columbia, S.C., who employed an inventive if deceitful rationale for
denying freedmen access to the city alms house. Only taxpayers were entitled to
access to this, he claimed—and, for all practical purposes, that constituted
whites.
Ex-slave William Beverly Nash, a former waiter at a
local hotel who would go on to become a respected state senator, and the
Freedmen’s Bureau pointed out some critical holes in this argument: first, that
more than 100 freedmen were already paying taxes and their numbers would only
swell with time; and second, that if the alms house were only limited to
taxpayers, many whites in tax arrears—a considerable number—would face
privation as well as blacks.
Among the powers vested in the bureau was its legal
authority. In the early years after the war, local officials were loath to put
whites on trial for crimes against blacks. The emancipated slaves looked to the
Freedmen’s Bureau to help redress the balance.
Unfortunately, just as the Supreme Court has chipped
away Lyndon Johnson’s landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965, so an earlier
incarnation of the high court helped to short-circuit hope for permanent racial equality in the
South. Ex parte Milligan (1866)
suggested that, with victory secure, the court would increasingly find against
extraordinary measures such as the Freedmen’s Bureau.
The image accompanying this post, an illustration for Harper's Weekly, captured the way in which administrators from the bureau often found themselves in a near-impossible position as honest brokers between blacks and whites in the defeated former Confederacy. For that reason, all-too-many whites shed no tears over the termination of the bureau in 1872.
For blacks, it was another story. As the forces of racism and reaction gathered, they saw fewer institutions around that could help them.
Two years later, another organization signed into law by Abraham Lincoln on the same day as the Freedmen’s Bureau, the Freedmen’s Bank, collapsed, undone by changes in its original charter, the impact of the Panic of 1873, mismanagement and fraud. Together, the loss of these two institutions hamstrung African-Americans’ attempt to gain their rightful place in postwar America.
The image accompanying this post, an illustration for Harper's Weekly, captured the way in which administrators from the bureau often found themselves in a near-impossible position as honest brokers between blacks and whites in the defeated former Confederacy. For that reason, all-too-many whites shed no tears over the termination of the bureau in 1872.
For blacks, it was another story. As the forces of racism and reaction gathered, they saw fewer institutions around that could help them.
Two years later, another organization signed into law by Abraham Lincoln on the same day as the Freedmen’s Bureau, the Freedmen’s Bank, collapsed, undone by changes in its original charter, the impact of the Panic of 1873, mismanagement and fraud. Together, the loss of these two institutions hamstrung African-Americans’ attempt to gain their rightful place in postwar America.
Despite the overwhelming odds against it, the
Freedmen’s Bureau did have some accomplishments, including:
* constructing and staffing more than 1,000 African
American schools, and spearheading the rise of the public school system in the
South;
* establishing a number of colleges
and training schools for blacks, including Howard University (named for General
Howard) and Hampton Institute, an institute of industrial education that sought
to instill the ideal of economic self-help;
* building hospitals for the freed slaves and giving direct medical aid to more than 1 million of them; and
*distributing food and clothing to freed slaves and
Southern white refugees.
In retrospect, with more than 80 years of experience
with extensive government programs starting with the New Deal, it’s easy to
itemize all the ways in which Reconstruction in general and the Freedmen’s
Bureau in particular fell short. But that fails to account for the
“unprecedented situation” they faced, as outlined forcefully by historian James
M. McPherson in Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction:
“The emancipation of four million slaves and the
reconstruction of a society torn apart by civil war were totally new
experiences. No model existed to guide those who had to deal with them. There
was no tradition of government responsibility for a huge refugee population and
no bureaucracy to administer a large welfare, employment and land reform
program. Congress and the army and the Freedmen’s Bureau were groping in the
dark. They created the precedents. And, in doing so, they had to overcome the
determined opposition of the president and the bitter resistance of many
southern whites. No other society in history had liberated so many chattel
slaves in so short a time at such a cost in lives and property. No other
country had established a Freedmen's Bureau to help the transition from slavery
to freedom. No other society had poured so much effort and money into the
education of freed slaves. If the result fell short of entire success, the
alternative might well have been total failure.”
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